








Analysis of chosen terrorist issue
Jaros³aw JAÑCZAK
Institute of Political Science and Journalism
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznañ
Polish and Finnish Terrorism at the Turn of XIX
and XX Century. In the Search for Theoretical
Explanation of Terrorist Acts at the Edge
of Western Civilization
Introduction
Contemporary terrorist academic literature seems to concentrate on Islamic
violence acts in the second part of XX and at the beginning of XXI first century
(Hamas, Jichad, Al Qaeda, ect.1), sometimes taking into consideration ideologi-
cally motivated terrorist attacks in Western European states during the cold
war (Red Brigades, Red Army Fractions, ect.2) or nationally driven in the fol-
lowing decades (ETA, IRA, ect.3). This focus has been strengthened by New
York attacks on September 11, 2002 and subsequent ones in Madrid and Lon-
don. Wild, poor and blind by religion Muslims were to threaten civilized and
stable countries of Western World. The ground for such a perception of interna-
tional developments was facilitated by theorists who had announced civiliza-
tion conflict as a new post cold war world order.4 Self image of civilizational
superiority allows many states and societies to forget about their own terrorist
tradition, to condemn this form of fight as well as to participate in different
forms of mediation groups, counter terrorist alliances, ect., Contemporary ter-
rorist acts are often described as unacceptable way of fighting for political and
social aims. At the same time very similar methods were used, especially at the
turn of XIX and XX century, by many European nations, what is still – usually
in veiled and modified form – appreciated as a part of struggle for independ-
ence. Additionally nowadays explanations of terrorism tend to stress ideology,
1 R. M. Barnas, Terroryzm: od Asasynów do Osamy bin Ladena, Wroc³aw 2001.
2 Y. Alexander, D. A. Pluchinsky, Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organi-
zations, New York 1992.
3 E. Martinez-Herrera, National Extremism and Outcomes of State Policies in the Basque
Country, 1979–2001, “International Journal on Multicultural Studies” 2002, vol. 4, no 1.
4 E.g. S. P. Huntington, Zderzenie cywilizacji, Warszawa 1997; B. R. Barber, Jihad vs.
McWorld, Rutgers 1995.
economic conditions and psychological factors as decisive factors in terrorism
developments. For example Sebastian Wojciechowski enumerates three groups
of factors contributing to creation of terrorism: ideas (regarding political orien-
tation, ethnicity, religion or ideology), economic and social conditions in loca-
tions of terrorists origins (poverty, unemployment, economic discrimination)
and psychological aspects of behavior motivations. Those overlapping factors
form so called “triad of terrorist motivation,” facilitating conditions for terror-
ist acts.5 But when developing analytic workshop also further elements could
be mentioned, e.g.: power imbalances as well as values and socials structures
behind the phenomenon.
This paper’s aim is to analyze factors determining historical developments
of terrorism and test them in different theoretical perspectives. The main re-
search questions addressed in this paper are what contributes to creation and
implementation of terrorist ideas, and define their form as well as frequency.
Here the central thesis is that terrorism as a phenomenon of violent interests’
articulation might be typical for different societies and its form depends on cul-
tural and social factors. States and societies in similar situation might react dif-
ferently in violence creation what reflects their different cultural and social
patterns. Empirical analyses will base on Finland and Poland as countries in
comparable political situation at the end of XIX and at the beginning of XX cen-
tury. Both were the eastern outskirts of western civilization, conquered and
controlled by tsars’ empire. In both cases the reaction for Russian oppression
included terrorism but its scale, perception and commemoration were differ-
ent. Terrorism as a concept will not be defined here due to two reasons: text lent
limitations, phenomenon’s complexity (defining terrorism is a problematic
task, and a source of disputes among scholars around the world6). Analysis
will base in this respect on considerations presented in previous articles of this
thematic series.7
Poland and Finland at the Turn of XIX and XX Century
Lack of independent statehood in Poland and Finland made both, revived
in the middle of XIX century, nations concentrate on regaining/gaining full
sovereignty. The Finnish and Polish autonomy was based on constitutional
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less Actor on the International Stage, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznañ 2005, p. 5.
6 B. Bolechów, Counterterrorism After 9/11, in: Terrorism as a Timeless Actor on the Interna-
tional Stage, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznañ 2005, pp. 64–65.
7 Books on terrorism edited by Sebastian Wojciechwski: Terrorism as a Timeless Actor on
the International Stage, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznañ 2005; The Power of Terrorism, T. Wallas,
S. Wojciechowski (eds.), Poznañ 2005; The Faces of Terrorism, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznañ
2006.
acts8. The constitution given to the Kingdom of Poland was more liberal than
that given to Finland and guaranteed a larger amount of rights. Until the No-
vember Uprising (1830) the Kingdom of Poland had a large autonomy, which
was also much wider than that of Finland. However, in 1817 the Finns have al-
ready undertaken the first careful attempts to gain their own written constitu-
tion.9 But liberal constitution, together with the attitude of the Polish elites
towards respecting it, turned out into reasons of trouble for the Kingdom,
while a resurrection of expectations occurred. That caused the disappointment
of Alexander I towards the Polish governance and hitherto the radicalization of
attitudes led on the one side to repression and on the other side to active resis-
tance. In Finland the situation looked differently. The absence of statehood tra-
ditions, self-governance and leading elites, that would act as natural advocates
of the first two, caused minor demands and expectations. Finns remained rela-
tively passive, while waiting for better circumstances in order to postulate their
conditions for autonomy. Additionally, the Swedish-speaking elites were satis-
fied with maintaining the status quo after gaining control over territories and
the acknowledgment of their rights by the Tsar.
The limitation of self-reliance, as a consequence of the Polish resistance dur-
ing the November Uprising, made the status of both states similar. The Polish
unhappiness and the consecutive Tsar repressions in between 1832–1863 ac-
companied the imperturbable attitudes of Finns. In fact, when the January Up-
raising collapsed (1964) the rest of the Polish autonomy was taken away, while
Finland was moving into the stage of its highest prosperity. Despite the fact
that, in between 1809–1863 the Finnish parliament was not summoned even
once (except for the Porvoo meeting in 1809), the elites in Finland, until that
moment in a decisive majority of Swedish speakers, remained very loyal to the
Tsar.10 The Finnish loyalty reached its peak during the Crimean War and the
January Uprising, was awarded by Alexander II. The autonomy was extended
as a result of many liberal reforms and the national political and social develop-
ment was finally possible.11 Contrary to Poland, the Finns manage to take full
advantage of the given autonomy. They decided for a non military course of ac-
tion based on their understanding of the conditions and rules that existed in
19th century Empire, as well as of the legal procedures determining the patterns
of behaviour. The Senate (government of the Great Duchy of Finland) work out
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8 J. Hartley, The Constitution of Finland and Poland in the Reign of Alexander I: Blueprints for
Reform in Russia?, in: Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A comparative Study, M. Branch,
J. Hartley, A. M¹czak (eds), London 1995, p. 48.
9 J. Paasivirta, Finland and Europe. International Crises in the Period of Autonomy 1808–1914,
London 1981, p. 40.
10 J. Kekkonen, The Main Trends in Finnish Legal History during the Period of Autonomy, in:
Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A comparative Study, M. Branch, J. Hartley, A. M¹czak
(eds), London 1995, p. 113.
11 Ibidem, p. 116.
procedural patterns, as well as its own ethos. However, the lack of independent
institutions lasting from the times of the Swedish ruling, resulted in the fact
that the newly created procedures were best matching XIX conditions.12 That
happened mainly, while they were not encumbered by historical ballast and
archaic social relations.
The situation changed at the very end of XIX century. Several attributions of
the Finnish autonomy were limited. Since 1899 the issues related to the Empire
were taken away from the Finnish competency and given to the Russian ad-
ministration in St. Petersburg. The given imperial law was pre-empting the na-
tional one. In 1901, the Finnish and Russian army were united. (It has to be
remembered that no other imperial territory had its own army during that
time). However, the example of the Finnish autonomy agreed upon in the first
half of the XIX century, ceased to match the Russian defence ideals at the end of
century. In 1902, the Russians gain access to Finnish offices.13 It should be men-
tioned that the majority of the listed actions and action proposals towards Fin-
land had been brought to life on the Polish territories situated under Russian
control already much earlier – since the January Uprising. The policy of repres-
sion led to the stirring of movements aimed at defending the Finnish auton-
omy. The forms and manners of action were determined by political realism,
which indicated, that armed actions, active resistance or other forms of military
action might have resulted in a tragic counter reaction. The majority of the pro-
tests however accepted the forms of action, which were not prohibited by law.
Those were protests, the collection of the signatures for petitions, or other acts
of citizen insubordination.14
Analysing the Finnish positioning in the Russian Empire one has to observe,
that throughout three quarters of time, the Russian domination was beneficial
and was developing in the desired directions. The fundaments of Finnish state-
hood, brought about by the Russians, were becoming stronger. The absence of
radical actions was caused in the beginning by the lack of elites, nation and
state traditions. The main goal for both Russian and Finnish was the mainte-
nance of a status quo satisfactory for both sides. The consolidated fundaments
of loyalty and realism were bringing benefits, did not allow radical actions to
happen and restricted activities to the frames provided by law. The legal ac-
tions meant avoiding violence and at the most, accepting the passive resistance
and protests orchestrated by the Kagal (fin. Kagaali) organisation.15 Finns re-
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12 O. Jussila, How did Finland Come under Russian Rule, in: Finland and Poland in the Russian
Empire. A comparative Study, M. Branch, J. Hartley, A. M¹czak (eds.), London 1995, p. 71.
13 J. Pajewski, Historia powszechna 1871–1918, Poznañ 2002, p. 86.
14 E. Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, Princeton University Press,
1981.
15 The protest against the February manifest from 1899 took the shape of collecting signa-
tures for the petition addressed to the Tsar. It was signed by around half million of Finns.
Similarly, the law regarding language and military service faced civil insubordination ac-
sponded by writing a petition (signed by one fifth of the population) and later
by boycotting Russian institutions, especially conscription.16 On the other hand
“Finland’s example actually shows that the policy of oppression drove even
a previously relatively calm and passive part of the empire to the path leading
to uncompromising separatism, and eventually to independence.”17
The opposite situation occurred in Poland. The tradition of holding the
power together with the presence of strong Polish elites, such as formerly the
nobility, raised huge expectations connected to the range of autonomy. The
given autonomy was endangered though, by the attempts of enforcing it with-
out taking into consideration the conditions of the time. Legal actions were
faced with the Tsar’s ignorance, which led to radical movements.
Norman Davies points out three main differences between Poland and
Finland, namely the strategic, ethnical-demographical and mental character.18
Additionally for Poland, the Russian domination brought the end of a few cen-
turies of glorious and often powerful statehood tradition. Poland managed to
create its own culture and to establish its ruling over a considerable area in the
middle Europe. Polish nobility were the bearer of that tradition. By contrast to
Poland, Finland remained under the Swedish ruling and did not create its own
elites. The existing ones had Swedish origins and they were using Swedish lan-
guage. In addition, both the Finnish statehood and any other type of culture
different from the folk culture were absent. The Finnish language was the lan-
guage of the peasants. The Russian rulers brought thus the opportunity of
statehood emancipation, followed by that of language and nation.
Polish and Finnish Terrorism
Polish and Finnish terrorism appeared under very similar circumstances
– increased Russian oppression aiming at autonomy limitations. However
their frequency of terrorist acts differed as well as its perception.
Finnish terrorist acts were very sporadic. The most important and known
example of Finnish political terrorism was assassination of Russian General
Governor Nikolai Bobrikov.19 He symbolized the policy of brutal russifica-
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tions. See: O. Jusilla, Wielkie Ksiêstwo Finlandii 1809–1917, in: O. Jussila, S. Hentilä, J. Ne-
vakivi, Historia polityczna Finlandii 1809–1999, Kraków 2001, pp. 82–83.
16 M. Fry, Nationalism and the Orgins of World War One in Russia, www.sassoonery.de-
mon.co.uk.
17 C. Jokinen, Tyrannicide: “Heroism or Terrorism. Part I: The Case of Eugen Schauman,” “The
Eurasian Politician,” July 2007; M. Futrell, Northern Underground: episodes of Russian revolu-
tionary transport and communications through Scandinavia and Finland, 1863–1917, London
1963.
18 N. Davies, Bo¿e igrzysko. Historia Polski, vol. II, Kraków 1992, p. 461.
19 M. Klinge, Geschichte Finnlands im Überblick, Helskinki 1995, p. 104.
tion,20 increased oppression of 1899–190521 and “was a hated tyrant – even for
those who were otherwise prepared to be loyal to the Tsar.”22 As the main exec-
utor (in Finland) of Empire’s policy aiming at assimilation and unification of
the tsars’ state, he introduced several policies threatening the existence of Finn-
ish autonomy and Finnish nation. Bobrikov was shot by Eugen Schauman,
Finnish civil servant at Senat Square in the center of Helsinki on June 16, 1904.23
Assailant committed a suicide one moment later. What is important he was in-
volved in Activists movement – Finnish radical separatists, disappointed with
moderate and ineffective policy towards Russia. Activists had tried earlier to
kill the general several times, always unsuccessfully. Bobrikov policy was seen
as illegal (because by limiting Finnish autonomy he was breaking existing laws
and treaties) as a result his death was to bring “normality” back. This distin-
guished Activists in their own eyes from “ ‘senseless and barbaric’ terrorism of
nihilists and anarchists,”24 dominating at that time on “terrorist market” in Eu-
rope, especially in Russia.25
Act of Schauman inspired another terrorist attack, committed one year
later by Lennart Hohenthal. He killed a Finnish pro-Russian prosecutor Eliel
Soisalon-Soininen. Because he killed a Finn his attack was not considered as na-
tional heroism. But at the same time “the Activists in general had experienced
that direct action yielded more benefits then compliance even if it meant vio-
lence.”26 Several, mainly unsuccessful terrorist attacks on state officers were
conducted. But Activists did not managed to attract wider spectrum of society
and constitutional trend prevailed. As a result 1905 strikes were not connected
with terror and massive violence in Finland.27
Murder of Bobrikov fulfils at least two criteria of defining terrorism: attract-
ing attention and revenge. Both were achieved by attacker(s). On the other
hand no innocent civilians suffered and the attack was targeted at public offi-
cial and an foreigner (this is why – on the other hand – Hohenthal does not exist
in public memory as a national hero).
Bobrikov’s assassination was seen by Finns as an act of patriotism and
Schauman as a martyr, who sacrificed himself for the goodness of he nation.
His act from the very beginning was not classified as terrorism but tyrannicide
– something acceptable and justified under the conditions of Finnish nation
being persecuted by Russian Empire and simultaneously powerless in open
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22 C. Jokinen, Tyrannicide: Heroism or Terrorism…
23 S. Zetterberg, Viisi laukausta senaatissa, Otava 1986.
24 C. Jokinen, Tyrannicide: Heroism or Terrorism…
25 M. Tomczak, Evolution of International Terrorism, in: The Faces of Terrorism, S. Woj-
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26 C. Jokinen, Tyrannicide: Heroism or Terrorism…
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confrontation. This approach justified this terrorist act by changing its classifi-
cation and stressing specific circumstances. Schauman’s act was commemo-
rated by a memorial plaque in the building of the Council of State. This
approach might be found also now, but it is rather rare stance among political
elits.28 Nowadays, due to centenary, Finnish public opinion was deliberating if
Schauman was a hero or a terrorist. According to the prime minister Matti
Vanhanen “By today’s standard’s it was purely and act of political terrorism,
and altogether deplorable. […] At the time some felt that it was a heroic act,
which it was not. The same kind of thing can be seen right now around the
world. People celebrating murder.”29 As a result no celebration was organized
and additionally the place of attack remained closed general public.30
Official Finnish attitude towards Bobrikov’s case have had to change due the
international developments. Methods acceptable and used in the past could not
be appreciated nowadays. Grounds for independence and patriotism had to be
denied as not fitting contemporary classification of permissible fight methods.
Contrary to the Finnish case, terrorist acts were relatively common at the turn
of XIX and XX century in Polish territories, especially in Russian partition sector.
Polish tradition of noble parliamentarianism of XVII and XVIII century, which
was free from fighting forms present at that time in Wester European monar-
chies, was replaced a century later with terror violence, similar to the Italian one.
Powerless in the front of dominating enemy together with growing oppression
and limitations in autonomy pushed Poles towards that form of straggle. Polish
daggerers appeared as a consequence of January uprising in 1963 and later on its
downfall. They attacked high officials of tsarist’s regime, both of Polish and Rus-
sian nationality (about one thousand victims). Together with leaders capturing
the first phase of Polish terror ended. Second began in the last but one decade of
the century and combined in different cases nationalist, class and anarchist mo-
tives. Aleksander Kwiatkowski was one of the organizers of unsuccessful bomb-
ing attack against tsar Alexander II in 1980. One year later Ignacy Hryniewiecki,
on 13 May blew up a bomb killing the tsar, himself as well as an innocent private
person. Six years later, Bronis³aw Pi³sudski, borther of the future president Józef
Pi³sudski, prepared the next attack on tsar Alexander III.31
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28 The murder of the Russian General-Governor Nikolai Bobrikov by the Finnish activist
Eugen Schauman was not an act of terrorism or even terror. Meanwhile, the murders by
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deed terrorism. The difference is that Schauman did not seek agitating general fear by assas-
sinating Bobrikov, although the murder was politically motivated; also, Bobrikov was not
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30 P. Kauppinen, No folwers for Eugen Schauman, “Helsingin Sanomat,” June 15, 2004.
31 J. Besala, Sztyletem i broni¹. Kiedy byliœmy terrorystami, “Polityka” 2004, no 21.
1905 political developments were marked in Polish territories by terrorist
activity of Military Organization of Polish Socialist Party led by Józef Pi³sudski.
In February 1905 Iwan Kalajew killed Grand Duke Serge in Moskau.32
Military Organization of PSP (created in 1904) tried to be perceived as germ
of the future Polish army, a patriot formation not a terrorist one. Pi³sudski sev-
eral times opted against terrorist methods. Nevertheless MO carried out very
many actions of terrorist nature.33 On 18 August 1905 Wanda Krahelska tried to
kill general-governor Gieorgij Ska³³on in bombng attack. He was responsible
for 1905 manifestation pacification and further repressions. On August 15, 1906
in bombing attacks a few dozen policemen and collaborators were killed, mak-
ing it the most bloody terrorist attack of that time. Altogether Military Organi-
zation organized about 2500 actions. One of the most famous was a post train
assault.34 17 fighters robbed in Bezdany near Vilnus the public money trans-
ported to St. Petersburg, to finance structure creation in Galicia. Four future
prime ministers of Poland participated in this attack: Józef Pi³sudski, Walery
S³awek, Aleksander Prystor, Tomasz Arciszewski.
MO actions were seen by the Polish society as examples of Polish heroism
aiming at regaining independence. It followed the logics of military resistance
and uprisings, deeply rooted in Polish tradition and mentality. Additionally
terror initiators played later on, in sovereign Poland, prominent roles in the
public life. At the same time terrorist methods did not harmonized with Polish
self-image of brave and honorable soldiers, who honestly fight for justified
aims or against sneaky and dishonest enemies. Polish messianic beliefs re-
sulted in justification of struggle necessity and special role that the nation was
to play.
Nowadays terrorist traditions are not given prominence, on official web-
sites MO is even referred as a terrorist organization. On the other hand there are
rare voices reminding the context of independentary terrorism Poland,35 and
stressing lack of alternatives.36
Theoretical Explanations of Finnish and Polish Terrorism
In the light of the presented analysis, the dominating behaviours in the Pol-
ish and Finnish cases, are leading to the question of finding an explanation for
tendencies to more and less radical actions. The attempt to answer the ques-
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tion, why were Poles more keen to terrorist methods, whereas Finns were tilted
to them in lesser extent, may be done among others by using, after David Laitin
five theoretical explanations: historical sociology, power of symbols and insti-
tutions theory, anthropological analysis, micro-basic research and last but not
least historical methods.37
The historical sociology approach places the emphasis on the social classes
as leading element in the development of attitudes and methods of action. In
the case of Poland, the traditional nobility began to lose in XIX century its posi-
tion in favour of the bourgeoisie, the town citizens, the new bureaucratic class
and the new aristocracy in junction with the partition powers. Those groups,
included in the system provided by new, invasive determinants, were inter-
ested in the maintenance of the status quo bringing them benefits. Although, the
clash between the new elites, the old ones and the peasants influenced the radi-
calisation of both the old elites and the peasants, its materialization came as
military forms of action.
In what concerns Finland, the process did not occur in a manner and
amount comparable to the one in Poland. In the beginning, the Tsar rules were
based on designed for the old, Swedish-speaking elites. The emancipation of
the peasants, until then of Finnish origins, which occurred in the second half of
the century, did not lead to the creation of own elites, capable of replacing the
previous ones. The elites that existed simultaneously were divided in the mat-
ter of accepting the Russian policy towards Finland. The Finnish solidarity to-
wards Russia may be considered as an element limiting radicalism. It was only
during the civil war in 1918 that the discrepancy between the working class
and the old elites had led to the radicalisation of attitudes and military actions.
Soon afterwards, however, in the name of national unity the Finnish social de-
mocracy gave up revolutionist methods of fighting, proving the importance
it attached to parliamentarism, feminine type of culture38 and dominating
consensualism.39
The power of the symbols and institutions may be an indicator of the higher
radicalisation of groups in which omnipresent cultural institutions, such as
language, make collective action easier. Accordingly, language and cultural ho-
mogeneity would then increase the ability to perform military, also terrorist, ac-
tions. In the case of the XIX century Finland, the society was divided into
Swedish elites and emancipating peasant-majority. The Russian presence
though, was limited mostly to administrators and soldiers. Also the knowledge
of the Russian language was not widely spread among the Finns. Linguistic
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difference raised difficulties for Finnish to learn Russian (added to this, the
Finns were lacking any kind of pragmatic motivations), as well as for Russian
to learn Finnish. Moreover, the process of the Russian language penetration
into the Finnish lifestyle was limited by two additional factors. First, a lan-
guage autonomy principle, which assured exclusivity for Swedish language
domination in the national administration (guaranteed during the Russian
overtaking of Finland in 1908). Secondly, there was the process of replacing the
Swedish language with the Finnish one in the cultural, scientific and political
life during XIX century.
In the Polish case, the high level of Russian population present on ethnically
and historically Polish territories, led to the acceptance of the Russian language
by a much higher percentage of citizens. Additional factors accelerating the
process were the Russification policy, the interrelation of languages, the easi-
ness in accepting the language and the presence of other ethnical groups on the
former Polish territories,40 i.e. Byelorussians and Ukrainians among which the
absorption of Russian language was faster. While comparing the Finnish and
Polish situation it is difficult to clearly define the role and strength of the lan-
guage factor in explaining the reasons of radical actions.
Another approach suggested for the research of the phenomenon is the an-
thropological analyse41. The method is based on the pre-assumption that the
use of the strong arm, also terrorist, tactics leads to the self development of the
individual as both a citizen and a person. Such conviction is preserved in the
existing tradition, in legends based on the heroic battles, in models of heroes,
etc. The method used above, however, is not giving full explanation of the phe-
nomenon which is being described. On the one hand, Finland, in contrast to Po-
land, is in fact characterised by a feminine type of culture. On other hand, both
states are strongly underlining the pathos of struggle and defending the West-
ern World for the eastern threats.
A further approach in researching the sources of strong arm tactics and radi-
cal behaviours is characteristic for micro-basic research. David Laitin42 distin-
guishes as precondition for the materialization of those attitudes the need of
mobilising the recruits. In order for it to happen, two factors are required.
Firstly, there has to exist a social group in which violence is an element of nor-
mal cultural repertoire. This layer has to involve not only the elites, who as the
leading group are simultaneously unable to initiate radical actions, but firs of
all middle and lower classes, and especially young people. Second, each of the
162 Jaros³aw Jañczak
40 See: Europa nieprowincjonalna. Przemiany na ziemiach wschodnich dawnej Rzeczypospolitej
(Bia³oruœ, Litwa, £otwa, Ukraina, Wschodnie pogranicze III Rzeczypospolitej) w latach 1772–1991,
K. Jasiewicz (ed.), Warszawa–London 1999.
41 K. Wojciechowski, Antropological and Axiological Premises of Terrorism, in: The Faces of
Terrorism, S. Wojciechowski (ed.), Poznañ 2006.
42 D. Laitin, National revivals and…, pp. 32–33.
persons mentioned above has to be a member of local social groups (not politi-
cal or economic). In social groups the norms of honour are in force, determin-
ing the others to follow the actions of the leaders. This leads to a climax and
releases radical actions. The bigger the number of groups, the higher the possi-
bility that actions will take place. (According to Latain, in political groups the
crucial factor defining the rules of behaviour is a compromise reached by the
leaders; in economical groups though, the fair play rule is applied).
In Polish tradition the role of such a group was performed by the nobility.
It was a strong and numerous group, led by the conviction of its own
exceptionality and special privileges, but also of its duties, based on the con-
cept of honour and on the pathos of chivalry battles. The process of impover-
ishing the nobility determined plenty of youth to follow the historical
hero-fighters. In the XX century, the successors of this tradition transformed
into military-patriotic organisations (such as Sokó³) and Scouts movements.
The Finnish tradition is lacking social groups so strongly settled in tradition.
The Finnish nobility had Swedish origins and had no connection to Finnish
masses. Also the concept of honour was limited due to the lack of statehood
tradition.
Latain is warning upon the sustaining mechanism43 based on violence. Once
initiated, the violence is sustained by three factors. The first one is behaviour of
the local society – picking out tactical victories and diminishing strategic loss.
The second factor is the high cost of abandoning the communities dealing with
the escalation of violence. The third factor is the institutionalisation of the cul-
ture of violence. In the case of a dominant enemy power, situated on a given terri-
tory and having a higher and better access to weapons, military action is an
irrational behaviour. Therefore, support among potential recruits is not exist-
ing. However, if a small group performing an audacious and brave action,
aimed at damaging the enemy (i.e. Political assassinations, terrorist attacks) is
successful, it ensures wider support. It may propel further radical actions, cre-
ating the appearance of an advantage and is leading to the so-called tyranny of
sink costs. After individuals are joining military actions, their return to the pre-
vious state is incredibly difficult from both psychological and legal (ensuring
safety and immunity) reasons. Following the sequence of actions based on the
logical schema of action – repression – action, the creation of the culture of vio-
lence – state occurs, in which “regular people remain indifferent towards vio-
lence and perceive it as a part of ‘normal’ life.”44 Violence and terrorism are
becoming a part of cultural behaviours, adopted with the purpose of imple-
menting political plans. The described mechanism reveals to a wider extent the
reasons, why in Finland actions of violence took place only sporadically and
why there has not been an increase in the tradition of radical actions. The
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sustaining scheme also perfectly characterizes XIX and XX century Polish resis-
tance against partition powers and invaders. Unsuccessful revolts and upris-
ings became both a source of the moral victory myth, as well as a spiritual
model for another generations. The struggle for freedom and independence
was perceived as a patriotic duty, which in itself was an element of identity.
Struggle, including terrorist methods, as a natural state found its reflection in
messianic conceptions.
The last of the methods used by the analysis is the historical method. Based
on the previous historical analysis it is allowing the creation of the pattern of
leading behaviour in the Finnish and Polish cultures. The defining factor is the
way of reaction to increased pressure or external expectations. The functioning
of such a defined variable is shown by the manner of reaction to a given stimu-
lus: the degree of adjustment level is characterised by the tendency to submis-
sion or resistance. The analysis of the historical material is leading to the
statement that the level of adjustment is inversely proportional to the level of
pressure in the case of Poland and directly proportional in case of Finland
(Scheme 1). Together with the growth of pressure, the level of adjustment is
growing (Finland) or decreasing (Poland). Interdependence does not have a
linear character. The pace of value growth and loss is changing while approach-
ing limits. The limes, though, are defined by the nation/state survival in case of
Finland, as a result of a state centric political culture and in case of Poland by
the military and economic possibilities (a result of the glorious tradition of re-
sistance and freedom principle being a part of political culture.
“The model Pole, facing the dominating power […] is developing against it an






military and economical possibilities
existance of state-nation
Source: Author’s concept.
Scheme 1. Finland and Poland. Model of behavior patterns under external pressure
of own police forces, or the logic of the economic system, an inevitable stimulus
is leading to an inevitable reaction.”45 Forms of external pressure were contrary
to the sense of autonomy and glorious history, so they caused resistance in all
the possible forms. The lack of a rational thinking, though, created a closed
circle among: resistance, its breakthrough and the increase of the pressure. Its
effects during partition times were cyclical uprisings, revolts and acts of terror-
ism. They additionally contributed to strengthening of military struggle pathos
and heroism – i.e. national martyrs. Poles “are existing due to suffering and for
the suffering, and the majority of the daily professional, political and intellec-
tual decisions is essentially exposed to suffering.”46 Historically, the only op-
position to resistance were abilities. In the time of partition, the ability of
regeneration stood in the successive replacement among generations of young
men, killed in consecutive uprisings. The idea of struggle for our freedom and
yours and of fighting until the end had to lead to the creaton of terrorist activity, It
reflected limited abilities in the front of dominating oppressor.
In case of Finland, historical experience allowed to tolerate waves of pres-
sure and violence. Such an approach, owed to the lack of imperialistic tradi-
tions and realistic attitudes, was caused by the belief in its benefits. The
Russification process in XIX century did not meet counter actions based on vio-
lence. Political realism leaned towards concessions. The limit was a threat to
the existence of the Finnish state and nation. Only that type of pressure could
determine the Finns to embrace active resistance, military actions as well as ter-
rorist acts. The intensification of the pressure on the turn of the XIX and XX cen-
tury was perceived as such an example. It resulted in both radicalization and in
the assassination of general Bobrikow.
Conclusion
As shown in presented analyses, cultural and historical factors may play
very important role in creating and differentiating terrorist behaviors, their im-
plementation and social acceptance. Also conditions, especially related to
power imbalances, may have influential role for creating pro terrorist attitude.
Additionally European states, in the face of Islamic terrorism of XXI century,
are forced to forget or to redefine their terrorist heritage, often related to inde-
pendence struggle and linked to events and individuals of key importance
from the point of view of national history. Both Finland and Poland are good
example of all above-mentioned elements. Their similar situation under Rus-
sian control at the turn of XIX and XX century did not result in similar terrorist
activities. In Finland political terrorism was much less developed then in Poland.
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Differences may be explained by several theoretical approaches. In most of
them previous historical developments seem to play a very important role.
They are especially social structures (presence of nobility) and splendid his-
tory. They both, by creating the dominating norms of honor and freedom, ac-
celerated and strengthened violent activities, also of terrorist nature.
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